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Abstract: 
 
The paper provides new evidence on the relation between corporate governance practices, 
legal rights and European banks’ performance during the post-crisis period. Using a sample 
of 935 banks in 30 European countries, the results reveal that at a high level of legal 
protection European banks are more able to follow the international recommendations and 
codes of corporate governance practices and vice-versa.  
 
Additional analysis shows that all the corporate governance variables have the same impacts 
on the banks’ performance. At low, middle and high levels of legal protection, the results 
reveal positive impacts of committees’ number (such as remuneration, nomination and audit 
committee) and independent members of banks’ boards.  
 
The other dimensions of corporate governance (ownership concentration, executive pay and 
CEO duality) do not have any impact on bank performance. Only at the low level of legal 
protection the results show a negative impact on board size on European banks’ 
performance.      
 
 
Keywords: banks, corporate governance, legal rights, financial crisis, financial sector 
regulations, performance.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Beirut Arab University, Lebanon h.shaarani@bau.edu.lb  
 
Hani El-Chaarani 
 
 
539 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The waves of the financial crisis and corporate governance scandals within the last 
decade have established the answering waves of re-adjustments and re-regulations of 
the banking sector in Europe. At the beginning, the economists and financial 
analysts ascribed the financial crisis of 2008 to the credit conditions and housing 
policy. The governance policies of the banking sector were not understood to be the 
origin. The reviewing of the crisis in Europe and US took the view that governance 
practices were the major cause that allowed the crisis to develop worldwide. Some 
financial specialists (Sir Christopher Hogg, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lloyd, 2009; 
Peni and Vähämää, 2012; Allegret et al., 2016; Thalassinos et al., 2015; Suryanto, 
2016), and international reports (US Financial crisis inquiry commission, 2010; 
International financial corporation and European bank, 2012) argue that the 
governance was a major cause of the banking sector allowing a bad situation to get 
worse. Even the financial service Authority asserted in 2009 that the poor corporate 
governance practices had contributed to the latest financial crisis.   
 
The newest report of the Basel Committee (July, 2015) overhauled the report of 
Basel II through 14 principles concerning bank structure, disclosure, transparency, 
compensation, internal control, risk management, senior management and board 
structure. The OCED reports, the green papers of the European commission, the 
walker review, the European Central Bank reports and many other law reforms and 
reports were spread over the European Union member states to support the central 
role of the banking sector. Even at the worldwide level, the IMF (International 
monetary funds) and the World Bank have developed a set of corporate governance 
recommendations urging all countries to use them.          
 
However, legal origin and the protection level are as important as the actual legal 
adjustments. Beck et al. (2003a and 2003b) reveal that legal origin matters in 
financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt. 
Bebchuk and Roe’s (1999), La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000), and Claessens et al. 
(2000) shed light on the legal origin as the main element explaining the ownership 
structure and performance differences across countries. Stiglitz (1985), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Claessens et al. (2000), Giannarakis (2016) and many other authors 
have examined the impact of alternative legal origins regarding investor rights on 
firm valuation. For the authors a strong legal protection limits the expropriation of 
minority shareholders and promotes performance while a weak legal protection can 
lead the blockholders and the inside owners to abuse their positions.  
 
The European banking authority (EBA) stated in 2011 that the banking financial 
crisis and internal corporate governance weaknesses are caused by insufficient 
implementation of existing guidelines, especially in European countries 
characterized by a low level of protection and regulations. This is why our focus on 
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legal protection and origin becomes crucial for studying the performance and the 
governance structure of European banks. 
In Europe, protection levels vary a lot across countries due to differences in legal 
origins. Nowadays, five legal origins and three legal protection levels exist in 
Europe. The first one is the French civil law countries, characterized by the lowest 
level of legal protection (La Porta et al., 1998) and identified after the French 
revolution in the 19
th
 century before being developed with the French colonial era in 
many nations such as Spain and Belgium.   
 
The second legal origin is the Ex-Socialist law countries. It is emerged as a part of 
Europe after the dissolution of the Former Soviet Union in December 1991. This 
legal origin exists in many European countries such as Lithuania and Estonia and it 
is characterized by low level of legal protection (Caprio et al., 2007).  
 
The German and Scandinavian civil law countries appeared in many European 
countries such as Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These legal origins are 
derived from Roman legal traditions and they are characterized by middle level of 
legal protection (La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
The final legal origin in Europe is the English common law countries, considered as 
the highest level of legal protection in Europe (La Porta et al., 1998; Caprio et al., 
2007), frequently referred to the British Empire and evolved during the middle ages 
in some European countries such as Ireland
2
.    
 
The evidence generally indicates that legal origins and regulations might explain, at 
least in part, differences in banks valuation and governance structures in different 
countries. Previous research reveal that weak legal protection does lead to poor 
governance structure (Bayer and Burshop, 2009; Campbell and Turner, 2011; 
Thalassinos and Liapis 2014). Other researchers contend that it is impossible to 
separate legal protection level and firms’ valuation (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 
2000), while in the literature little attention has been paid to the impact of corporate 
governance on banks’ valuation when considering the legal protection level. 
 
In the light of different European legal origins, the aim of this research is to provide 
evidence by addressing the following questions: What is the impact of legal 
protection level on the corporate governance structures of European banks? And to 
which extent does the legal origin have an impact on the relationship between 
corporate governance structure and European banks’ valuation? Corporate 
governance and banks’ valuation have been the main concerns of researchers, 
                                                          
2
 For La Porta et al. (1998, 2002), three levels of legal protection are identified in European 
countries: the weak level of protection in French civil law countries, the stronger level of 
legal regulation in common law countries and finally the middle level of protection in 
German and Scandinavian civil law countries. Caprio et al. (2007) added the former 
socialist countries to the classification of La Porta et al. (1998, 2002)      
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economists, financial analysts and managers during the last decade. The stance taken 
in this research goes beyond the usual impact of corporate governance on banks’ 
valuation by considering legal regulations and the origins of European countries.  
 
The first objective of this research is to empirically investigate the governance 
policies and structures of European banks in three different levels of regulations: the 
lower level of protection (former socialist law and French civil law countries), the 
Middle level of protection (Scandinavian and German civil law countries) and the 
higher level of protection (common law countries). This first objective provides an 
opportunity to investigate if the regulation system in each country is considered as 
an important determinant of corporate governance practices and structures of the 
banking sector. 
 
The second objective is to capture in depth the impact of corporate governance on 
banks’ performance in different European regulations origins (former socialist law, 
French, Scandinavian, German and common law). Indeed, this second objective 
contributes to the existing literature by detecting the mutual impacts of governance 
practices and country regulation level on banks’ performance during the post-crisis 
period (2012-2013). For this reason, we consider it a relevant issue to investigate if 
the crisis outcomes have different impacts within the European countries.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections. The next section will be devoted 
to presenting the literature review, and mainly the corporate governance mechanism 
and banking regulations in Europe. The third section will present the theoretical and 
the practical aspects concerning the corporate governance of the European banking 
sector. Section four will describe the used methodology, the variable definitions and 
the sample selection process. Section five will show the map of corporate 
governance tendency and financial capacity concerning the banking sector in 
European countries. The last two sections report the findings and conclude the 
research. 
 
2. Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the Wave of Banking 
Regulations in Europe 
 
During the last decade, three stages of financial movements and regulations have 
been witnessed: The pre-crisis period (before 2007), the crisis period (between 2007 
and 2010) and the post-crisis period (after 2010).  
 
Several important features of the pre-crisis period have proved to be crucial for the 
banking sector and themselves were considered to be the main causes of the 
financial crisis. The pre-crisis period was characterized by a high level of uniformity 
in loan notes designs (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009), high credit growth and high 
levels of liquidity and financial innovation. A lot of people contracted housing loans 
larger than their capacities could afford. The credits were supplied liberally without 
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securitization and went out of control. The money of credits was used to push up 
houses prices. The banks’ managers were pushed to maximize shareholders returns 
(Aebi et al., 2012). The existing of independent board members, including the 
university professors, was correlated positively to risk-taking (Minton et al., 2010). 
The rating agencies assigned the highest rate level based on the principle that house 
prices would not fall. The majority of corporate governance studies were 
concentrated on the conflict of interests between managers, owners and board 
members. The attention was not well focused on the qualification of corporate 
governance practices. A lot of board members were not capable of dealing with the 
complexity of modern banking. Hau and Thumb (2009) found in the years before the 
financial crisis a significant positive correlation between low board members’ 
qualification and bank loss. At the end of 2006, the banking sector and the European 
banks had reached the turning point.   
 
The stability of the European banking sector came under the spotlight at the 
beginning of 2007 as a result of the international financial crisis which originated in 
the US and spread to worldwide. For Standard and Poor’s, the house prices began to 
decline around 20% towards the end of 2006. The homeowners found that their 
mortgage values were greater than the fair value of their houses. In September 2008, 
Lehaman and Brothers’ had reported a loss of 2.8 billion3 in the US mortgage 
market, which affected the risk premium level across the whole market. The 
investors’ fear turned to panic, which caused a high contracting economy in the US 
and Europe. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) found during the 
crisis period a positive correlation between bank risk-taking and ownership 
concentration. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) revealed a positive correlation between 
CEOs’ incentives and bank performance. In response, many European countries 
such as the UK, Italy, Sweden, France and Germany tried to review their corporate 
governance policies and their banking regulations, especially after the worldwide 
banks’ failures such as the German State Bank, the Royal bank of Scotland, Merrill 
Lynch and Citigroup. The majority of reforms were focused on the financial 
institutions, considered as the main source of the financial crisis.     
 
Over the crisis period the European banks were likely to be dominated by the legacy 
of the financial crisis. The financial service Authority asserted the immediate call for 
a revision of corporate governance practices in the banking industry. David Walker 
(2009), the person responsible for reviewing the corporate governance in the UK, 
stated the need to review corporate governance policies and financial regulations.  
Even Mr. De Larosière (2009), the Chairman of the European system of financial 
supervision declared that the corporate governance in banking sector must be re-
adjusted because it was one of the most important causes of the financial failure.     
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 Source: New York Times, 26 February 2009. 
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According to the most recently published report of the Basel committee on banking 
supervision (2015), enhancing corporate governance is critical to the proper 
functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. The last Basel 
committee guidance drew thirteen principles of corporate governance in the 
following areas: board responsibilities (1), board qualifications and board 
composition (2), board structure and practices (3), senior management (4), 
governance of group structures (5), risk management function (6), risk identification, 
monitoring and controlling (7), risk communication (8), compliance (9), Internal 
audit (10), compensation (11), disclosure and transparency (12), and finally the role 
of supervisors (13). The governance principles reflect a key lesson from the global 
financial crises to enhance the protection level of shareholders’ interest in 
conformity with depositors’ interest. They are recommended to be implemented in 
the banking sector by considering the bank characteristics such as bank size, 
complexity, economic significance and structure.  
 
Consistent with the Basel Committee, the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) report was focused on the enhancing of the banking 
industry through four corporate governance dimensions: Board practices, risk 
management, remuneration policies and owner rights. The recent OECD report has 
reinforced the board responsibilities in controlling the risk management function and 
setting remuneration. It also made many proposals to promote the board 
competencies and skills by identifying the appropriate members to protect the 
shareholders’ rights. The OECD document suggests the existence of independent 
members of management to carry out the board responsibilities. In addition, the 
corporate governance framework recommends the transmission of accurate 
information to shareholders, including the performance, financial situation, capital 
ownership and governance structure of the bank.      
 
Subsequently, the European Union commission published the Green paper focusing 
on the corporate governance of the banking sector. After summarizing the corporate 
governance failures in the banking sector, it indicated that the lack of effective 
control had contributed to the last financial crisis. In response, the commission made 
many directives, such as the increasing of independent board members at the 
financial institutions to ensure effective controlling system. The green paper has 
recommended the improvement of risk management, enhancement of banking 
supervision, the controlling of senior remunerations, implementation of a risk 
supervision committee, and the introduction of certain requirements for the auditing 
system.  
 
For the European banking authority (EBA-2011) the insufficient implementation of 
corporate governance contributed to banks’ insolvency in Europe.  The EBA 
suggested a standardized set of items to improve internal corporate governance 
efficiency. The first set of recommendations is related to the development of 
specialized committees’ roles, such as a risk committee, an audit committee and a 
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remuneration committee to increase banks’ performance and improve risk control. 
The second sets are related to banks’ transparency, risk management, corporate 
structure and internal control frameworks to prevent banks financial risk. EBA 
guidelines cover the duties and responsibilities of the management body. It also 
includes the required qualifications and independence level for members of the 
management body.   
 
The World Bank group published in 2015 a guide to corporate governance practices 
in the European Union. This recent guide covers a wider range of topics related to 
owners’ engagement, ethics and responsibilities. The diversity of board structures, 
directors’ duties, board size, board evaluation, the board nomination process, the 
director induction process, the remuneration of the management team, the external 
auditing process, risk management and internal control are well developed, analyzed 
and recommended to provide equivalent protection for owners and other parties 
concerned with European banks
4
. The importance of this recent report is that it 
examines the governance issues from all dimensions to generate a complete picture 
of European corporate governance. 
 
3. Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector: Theoretical and Practical 
Perspectives 
 
Corporate governance theory and agency theory deal with the problems of 
shareholders-managers that arise after the separation between ownership and 
management. For Jensen and Meckeling (1976) there is no problem when a manager 
owns the whole capital, but when his participation drops down, a conflict of interests 
appears due to the opposite sets of objectives within the same firm. Given the 
information asymmetries, such a problem also arises when the owner (principal) 
delegates a part of his responsibility and decision-making authority to the manager 
(agent) who has the intention of increasing his personal utility instead of the 
shareholders’ utility (Shleifer and Vishny, 1987). The interests of the manager can 
lead him to invest in risky projects to serve his personal objectives (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1987). For this reason, the shareholders should control the managerial 
behavior by inducing a set of three corporate governance mechanisms (board of 
directors, ownership structure and incentive system) that align the interests of the 
agent with the interests of the principal. 
 
a. Board of Directors 
Firstly, the firm should have an effective board of directors characterized by a high 
independent level, a limited number of members and CEO duality. The board of 
                                                          
4
 As for deposit insurance, on October 2008 the European Union council agreement pushed 
the membership states to have a coverage of at least 50 000 euros for each depositor. The 
non-European Union countries also followed the guides of the European Union council and 
raised the coverage on deposits.    
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directors is the main important instrument used by shareholders to monitor the 
management and solve conflicts within the firm (Jensen, 1993). 
Agency theory predicted that a smaller board size should be more effective because 
it is more capable of reducing the waste of time and conflicts within the board. On 
the contrary, a large board size is associated with less effective control. Jensen 
(1993) suggested seven or eight board members play an important role in the firm’s 
performance. In the banking sector, numerous studies revealed neutral, negative, 
positive or U-shaped relations between board size and banking performance. Using a 
sample of 58 European banks, Staikouras et al. (2007) reported a negative relation 
between board size and bank performance. Rowe, Shi and Wang (2011) also found a 
similar negative impact of the board size on 41 banks’ performance in China. The 
same negative relation between bank performance and board size also were revealed 
in Lebanon by El-Chaarani (2014), in Thailand by Pathan el al. (2007) and in Japan 
by Sakawa et al. (2009). Andres and Vallelado (2008) found a U-shaped relation 
between board size and a banks’ Tobin’s q in six OECD countries (Italy, France, 
UK, Spain, US and Canada). At the beginning, they detected a positive relation 
between board size and banks’ performance, but when the board members exceed 19 
members the relation becomes negative. Grove el al. (2011) found the same results 
in US banks. Belkhir (2009) found a positive relation between bank performance 
and board size in the US banking sector between 1995 and 2002. The same results 
were revealed in the banking sector by Adams and Mehran (2012) by using a sample 
of 35 US banks over the period of 1986-1999. 
 
As for board independence, the increasing of independent members leads to reduce 
the agency problems between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1993). Due to 
their experience they also can improve efficiency, play a role in risk assessment 
(Wearing and Li, 2010) and bring a critical viewpoint (Eilon, 1980). The empirical 
findings of board independence in bank performance are ambiguous. Pan (2013) 
found a negative impact of board independence on bank performance during the 
financial crisis. For Pan, independent board members are more professional in the 
decision-making and controlling functions. The same results were revealed in the 
banking sector by Adam and Ferraira (2009b), and Erkens et al. (2012). On the 
contrary, Krivogorsky (2006) showed a positive impact of independent members on 
banks’ performance in several European countries (France, Italy, Germany, Spain 
and the UK). Ferreira and Kirchmaier (2013) also reported a positive impact of 
board independence in European countries. For the authors, the existence of 
independents improves the operating system. In emerging countries such as 
Lebanon, El-Chaarani (2014) found a positive impact of independent members on 
bank performance. Belkhir (2009) does not show any significant impact of board 
independence on bank performance. The same results were reported by Aebi et al. 
(2011) from US banks, by Sakawa and Watanabel (2010) for Japanese banks and by 
Tandelilin et al. (2007) with Indonesian banks.   
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For the theory, the separation between the chairman of the board and the chief 
executive officer (CEO) leads to more independence and an effective control. 
Therefore, the CEO duality is associated with lack of control and greater CEO 
control over the board’s decision-making process. The CEO duality makes the 
assessment of managers more difficult and leads to an increase in the risk of rooting 
and agency costs (Jensen, 1993; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The empirical studies 
revealed a managerial entrenchment in the form of CEO duality. Mishra and Nielsen 
(2000) found a negative relation between CEO duality and bank performance.  
 
The same results were revealed in US banks by Grove et al. (2011), in Turkish banks 
by Kayman and Bektas (2008), in Pakistani banks by Mahmood and Abbas (2011) 
and in Lebanese banks by El-Chaarani (2014). Agoraki et al. (2010) have confirmed 
the negative impact of CEO duality on the banks’ performance. The authors 
indicated that CEO duality is considered a harmful situation which decreases the 
monitoring system of the board and amplifies the CEO’s power. Faleye and 
Krishnan (2010) showed a positive relation between CEO duality and lending to 
high-risk borrowers. On the other hand, other empirical works are not consistent 
with the theoretical view. Pathan et al. (2010) showed that CEO duality is negatively 
related to bank risk-taking; and Belkhir (2009) found a positive impact of CEO 
duality on savings banks’ performance.    
 
Regarding the controlling activities, the last financial crisis and the corporate 
governance scandals have triggered the publishing of new recommendations to 
overhaul the poor corporate governance practices in the banking sector. Nowadays, 
many committees appear in European banks such as a risk management committee, 
an audit committee, a nominating committee and a compensation committee. The 
number of committees and their roles are not the same in the different European 
banks even within the same country.     
 
b. Ownership Structure 
Another dimension of corporate governance studied before and after the financial 
crisis is the ownership structure. The issue of ownership concentration is salient for 
European Union commissions and organizations as a vast percentage of European 
banks are controlled by a few number of shareholders. The agency theory stated that 
the separation between ownership and control increases the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In widely held 
companies, a new type of conflict can appear between large and small shareholders, 
especially in countries with weak protection practices (Bebchuck el al., 2000). For 
Faccio et al. (2002) the risk of expropriation is at the highest level when the ultimate 
shareholders use the deviation from one share-one vote devices (dual class voting 
shares and pyramid structures). Bebchuck et al. (2000) pointed out that the excess of 
voting rights over cash-flows rights could reduce the overall performance and distort 
corporate decision with respect to investment projects choice. To sum up, from a 
theoretical viewpoint, a concentrated ownership structure and a low level of 
deviation between ownership rights and voting rights can limit the power of the 
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manager or outside block-holder in a way to prevent entrenchment behavior and the 
expropriation of private benefits. 
The empirical results showed that the ownership structures of European banks vary 
with the protection level of investors (EL-Chaarani, 2015). Caprio et al. (2007) and 
Busta (2008) revealed a mutual impact of ownership concentration and regulation on 
bank performance. For the authors it is not possible to study the impact of banks’ 
ownership without considering their legal protection practices. They found that 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on bank performance in countries 
with a weak protection level of investors. Westman (2011) found that European 
banks with high managerial ownership concentration perform better than banks with 
dispersed ownership structure. He argued that the management-ownership 
concentration can be used as a monitoring tool in banks that are difficult for 
outsiders to control. Grove el al. (2009) pointed out a positive impact of ownership 
concentration on the performance of US banks. Kobeissi and Sun (2010) also 
showed a positive association between ownership structure and private bank 
performance. Antoniades et al. (2010) for Greek banks and Magalhaes et al. (2010) 
for 795 banks worldwide showed a nonlinear relationship between ownership 
concentration and bank performance. 
 
However, many empirical studies confirmed that the ownership concentration come 
with some costs. It can be used by shareholders to extract the private benefits and 
expropriate the minority shareholders, especially in countries characterized by a 
weak protection level of minority investors. Laeven and Levine (2009) showed that 
a larger shareholder tends to maximize bank risk when his power is based on a high 
deviation level between cash-flows and voting rights. Kiruri (2013) found a negative 
effect of ownership concentration on bank performance in Kenya. Lanotta et al. 
(2007) did not find any relationship between ownership concentration and bank 
performance. 
 
c. Executive Compensation  
The final dimension of corporate governance is the adopting of appropriate incentive 
systems for CEOs and board members. After the last financial crisis the 
compensation practices became more treated in corporate governance reports, Basel 
recommendations and all the European Union commissions. Agency theory 
considers remuneration as a relevant tool to minimize the conflicts between principal 
(shareholder) and agent (manager). Accordingly, a professional incentive pay in 
terms of structure and level will lead the CEO of a bank to create value for 
shareholders and stakeholders (Larker and Tayan, 2011). Also it will lead him to 
make the right decision because he will be rewarded for good performance and 
punished for bad performance.  
 
This theoretical principle is consistent with some empirical findings. Sun (2014) and 
Sierra et al. (2006) showed a positive relationship between bank performance and 
CEO compensation. Accordingly, Amess and Drake (2003) proved that executive 
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pay is positively associated with the US bank performance. John et al. (2010) 
confirmed the positive impact of CEO compensation on bank performance. They 
documented a positive association between CEO compensation and monitoring 
intensity. 
 
Other studies showed a negative or non-significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and bank performance. For many specialists the used compensation 
practices (bonus, stock-option) were considered as a contributing factor to the last 
financial crisis in the banking sector. For example Suntheim (2010) found no 
evidence that banks with higher incentives were aligned with shareholders’ interests. 
Girma et al. (2007) pointed out a weak association between pay and performance. 
Guo et al. (2014) confirmed this weak association between CEO remuneration and 
US bank performance during the financial crisis period (2007-2008). Based on a 
sample of 306 financial institutions in 31 countries, Hung and Matos (2012) found 
that financial institutions that used compensation contracts (bonuses) took more risk 
and performed worse during the crisis period. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) found a 
negative association between bank performance and CEO compensation. For this 
reason corporate governance and bank regulators tried to protect the shareholders by 
giving more attention to the remuneration committee that must work closely with the 
other banking committees in evaluating the different types of incentives. Sun el al. 
(2009) confirmed that high compensation committee quality has a positive impact on 
the association between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
 
4. Methodology, Variable Definition and Sample  
 
The target population of this study consists of investment, commercial, cooperative 
and saving banks in Europe. The initial sample consists of 8,532 listed and non-
listed European banks distributed in 49 European countries. From the initial sample 
of banks, a large number has been excluded due to missing data of ownership 
structure, financial data, board of directors and executive compensation. All the 
European banks that are controlled by other banks in other countries are removed 
from the sample to eliminate the risk of multiple counting. The final sample includes 
935 European banks in 30 European countries
5
 and 1,590 bank-year observations 
extracted from the years 2012 and 2013. This study takes the end of the years 2012 
and 2013 to reflect the corporate governance practices and banks’ valuations after 
the financial crisis period. 
 
                                                          
5
France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, 
Ireland, Norway, UK, Switzerland, Cyprus, Austria, Malta, Netherlands and Luxemburg 
from Western Europe. Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia from Eastern Europe. Estonia from the Former 
Soviet states.  
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The banks’ data are obtained based on the incorporation of various information 
channels. Financial and non-financial data are retrieved from the published annual 
reports and the international bank database (BankScope). The legal data concerning 
protection rights and legal origins respectively were extracted from the index of 
economic freedom and La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2002) studies. The board of 
directors’ data is also obtained from BankScope database and updated from the 
published annual reports.  
 
As a first step for the empirical analysis, the European countries are divided into 
many sub-samples of countries with a similar protection level of investors based on 
the Moral Hazard Index
6
 (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache; 2002) and La Porta et al. 
(1998) classification. In the second step, the 935 European banks are grouped into 
sub-samples of banks with similar regulatory environment. In the last step, each sub-
sample of European banks is studied to examine the corporate governance behavior 
and its impact on bank valuation by considering the regulatory environment. To this 
end a quantitative method was applied in which both described and multivariable 
statistical analyses are involved based on a set of variables to provide an accurate 
picture of the corporate governance situation of the European banking sector.          
 
As for the variables definitions, bank valuation is measured by the year-end returns 
on assets (ROA)it and the year-end return on equity (ROE)it. Both return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are widely used in previous researches on the 
banking sector. The accounting-based measures are considered in this study because 
both unlisted and listed banks are included in the sample.  
 
The first corporate governance dimension is the ownership concentration (OC)it. 
This variable is measured by the direct and indirect ownership concentration of the 
ultimate bank owners at the year-end with 10% as a cutoff rate.  
 
The second dimension of corporate governance is the board of directors. This 
dimension is measured through three sub-variables: firstly, the board of directors 
independence (BOI)it, representing the number of independent (non-executive) 
members on the board at the year-end; secondly, the board of directors size (BOS)it, 
representing the number of board members at the year-end; thirdly, the CEO duality 
(CEOD)it, representing a dummy variable that is coded to one if the board chairman 
has the title of CEO and zero otherwise.    
 
The third dimension of corporate governance in the banking sector is the controlling 
of banks’ activities (CA)it. This variable is incorporated as a new dimension to 
                                                          
6
The index includes many variables such as: Coinsurance, deposit insurance limit per 
person, legal action in case of violation and deposit insurance premium.  
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capture the number of existing committees such as the Compensation, Risk, 
Nomination and Audit committees.     
 
The final dimension of corporate governance is executive compensation (ExCO)it. 
This variation is one of the active fields of debate and it is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the three highest executive pay at the year-end. The executive pay 
consists of basic salary, bonus, shares, stock-option and long-incentive plans.  
The control variables are represented by the natural logarithm of the average total 
assets of the bank (Bsize)it, the ratio of debt over the total assets (LEV)it and the non-
performance loan to gross loan (NPEL)it at year-end. All the variables are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variables Definition  
Variable  Variable Definition 
ROA it Net profit over total assets at year-end 
ROE it Net income over total equity at year-end 
OC it Direct and indirect percentage of ownership concentration with 10% cutoff at 
year-end 
BOI it Number of non-executive members at year-end 
BOS it Number of board members at year-end 
CEOD it Dummy variable that is coded to one if the board chairman has the title of CEO 
at year-end 
CA it Number of existing committees at year-end 
ExCO it Natural logarithm of the highest three executive pay at year-end 
Bsize it Natural logarithm of the average total assets at year-end 
LEV it Ratio of debt over the total assets at year-end  
NPEL it Non-performance loan to gross loan at year-end 
 
5. Legal Protection Map and Corporate Governance Behavior of the 
European Banking Sector 
 
The sample consists of 935 banks in 30 European countries (Figure 1). The 
descriptive statistics in Figure 1 indicate that 806 (86%) banks of the study’s sample 
are located in Western Europe, while 129 (14%) are located in Eastern Europe. This 
distribution indicates the greater development of the banking sector in Western 
Europe than Eastern Europe, especially in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK 
and Finland. Based on the European Banking Federation Report (2012) the total 
number of banks in Eastern Europe is 6,446 (81.5%) while the total number in 
Western Europe and the Former Soviet states is 1,446 banks (18.5%). For 2012 the 
total assets of the whole population are around 49,069,243.1 million EUR while the 
total assets of the study’s sample are around 12,998,474.87 million EUR.  
 
The amount of total loans is 24,263,298.8 million EUR for the population, while the 
amount of total loans for the sample is 4,846,451.69 million EUR. As for bank 
deposits, the amount is 22,575,049.74 million EUR for the population and 
4,767,927.23 million EUR for the sample. To sum up, these values show that the 
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study’s sample represents around 20% of the European banks in 30 European 
countries.  
Figure 1: Sample Distribution 
 
 
The result of Figure 2 indicates that the average of ownership concentration in 
European banks is 39%, the average number of committees is around 2.4, the 
number of controllers in banks’ board is around 11 and the independent members are 
around 6. The CEO Duality exists in 32% of European banks and the average log for 
the three highest pay is 14.2. 
 
Figure 2: Average of corporate governance practices in Europe  
 
 
The situation of ROE in European banks is largely different (Figure 3). The 
maximum mean of ROE is detected in Sweden, Norway, Czech Republic and 
Estonia. The value of ROE is negative in many European countries such as Greece, 
Ireland, Slovenia, Romania, Hungary and Italy due to the country’s financial 
difficulties and the financial restructuring of the banking sector. 
 
 
 
 The Mutual Impacts of Corporate Governance Dimensions and Legal Protection Systems on 
the Performance of European Banks: A Post-Crisis Study  
552 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bank’s Return on equity (2012-2013): Mean Per country 
 
 
Figure 4 quantifies the ROA values of European banks during 2012 and 2013. Spain, 
UK, Germany, Switzerland and Latvia have improved their ROA values during 
2013. The highest level of ROA is registered in Estonia, Czech Republic, Malta, 
Poland and Lithuania. After the recovery of the European banking sector in 2010, 
Figure 3 indicates that this sector fell back into recession during 2012 and 2013 in 
many European countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Slovenia, Romania, 
Hungary and Italy.  
 
Figure 4: Bank’s Return on Assets (2012-2013): Mean Per country 
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Figure 5 illustrates the average of ultimate ownership concentration in European 
banks. The minimum concentration averages exist in the UK (22.34%) and Ireland 
(24.03%). The maximum ownership concentrations of European banks appear in 
Poland (64.23%), Lithuania (63.42%), Croatia (66.01%) and Estonia (65.29%). In 
these former socialist countries, the highest percentage of bank assets is owned by 
foreign investors. 
 
Figure 5: Ownership concentration of European banks (2012-2013) 
 
 
In Figure 6 the results indicate the highest average size of the board of directors 
exists in Germany, with 17 members and 9 independent members. The lowest 
average size of the board of directors exists in Croatia with 6 members and 2 
independent members. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the maximum average of 
controlling committees exists in the UK, with 5 committees, and the minimum 
average exists in Hungary, with 2 committees.   
 
Figure 6: Controlling characteristics of European banks (2012-2013) 
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Figure 7 quantifies the natural logarithm of the three highest executive pay at year-
end. The highest values of natural logarithm exist in Germany, France and UK, 
which indicate that these three countries are characterized by a high level of 
executive compensation. The lowest values are shown in the former Soviet Union 
countries such as Lithuania and Estonia. The banking sector and the bank size in 
these countries are very small and the banks’ financial capacities cannot afford the 
same capacity as that of the biggest banks in Europe.      
 
Figure 7: Executive pay of European banks (2012-2013) 
 
 
a. Legal Protection System and Corporate Governance Tendency 
In light of the different European legal systems and origins, three classification 
stages are used in this study to capture the impact of the legal protection level on the 
corporate governance structures of European banks.  
 
Firstly, the 30 European countries of the study’s sample are divided into five sub-
samples based on legal origin: French civil law countries, former socialist law 
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countries, English common law countries, German civil law countries and 
Scandinavian civil law countries.  
 
Secondly, these five sub-samples of European countries are classified into three 
levels of protection based on Moral Hazard Index: low legal rights, middle legal 
rights and high legal rights. Thirdly, the banks in each country are placed in each 
group of Law Level – Law Origin (see Table 2 for the different classifications and 
the total number of banks in each group)
7
. 
 
Table 2: Sample classification  
 
French civil 
law 
countries 
Ex-Socialist 
law countries 
English 
common 
law 
countries 
German civil 
law countries 
Scandinavian 
civil law 
countries 
Low 
legal 
rights 
France, 
Spain 
Belgium, 
Italy 
Malta, 
Netherlands, 
Luxemburg. 
(292 banks) 
Croatia, 
Bulgaria, 
Poland,Czech-
Republic, 
Hungary, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Romania, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
(129 banks) 
   
Middle  
legal 
rights 
   
Germany, 
Portugal, 
Greece, 
Switzerland, 
Cyprus, 
Austria. 
(239 banks) 
 
Sweden, 
Finland, 
Denmark, 
Norway. 
(139 banks) 
High 
legal 
rights 
  
UK, 
Ireland. 
(136 
banks) 
  
 
The study’s sample presented in Table 2 indicates that 421 banks (45%) are 
considered as a part of low legal rights countries; 378 (40%) are considered as a part 
of middle law rights countries; and 139 banks (15%) belong to high legal rights 
countries.  
 
                                                          
7
 These classifications are based on the classifications of La Porta et al. (1998; 2002) and 
Caprio et al. (2007). 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of corporate governance tendency based on legal 
origins  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics per legal origin   
Variable \ Legal system 
French 
civil law 
countries 
Former 
socialist 
law 
countries 
English 
common 
law 
countries 
German 
civil law 
countries 
Scandinavian 
civil law 
countries 
OCit 0.421 0.607 0.243 0.442 0.332 
BOI it 5.34 2.68 7.35 7.11 5.04 
BOS it 11.38 8.04 12.15 13.23 9.05 
CEOD it 0.39 0.43 0.21 0.36 0.32 
CA it 2 2.2 3.5 2.2 2.4 
ExCO it 14.56 13.38 14.6 14.61 13.69 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics per law rights level  
Variable \ 
Legal 
system 
Low legal rights (French 
Civil law countries and 
Former Socialist 
countries) 
Middle legal rights 
(German and 
Scandinavian civil law 
countries) 
High legal rights 
(English common 
law countries) 
OC it 0.54 0.387 0.243 
BOI it 4.01 6.075 7.35 
BOS it 9.71 11.04 12.15 
CEOD it 0.41 0.34 0.21 
CA it 2.1 2.2 2.9 
ExCO it 13.97 14.05 14.6 
 
Table 3 (Panel B) and Figure 8 indicate that the level of law rights has a correlation 
with all the corporate governance variables of European banks. In high legal rights 
countries, the ownership is widely dispersed (24.3%) while large blockholdings is 
dominated in middle legal rights countries (38.7%) and low legal rights countries 
(54%).  
 
It follows that in case of concentrated ownership in countries with low legal 
protection level, large shareholders have the incentive to expropriate the minority 
shareholders and agency problems appear between minority and large shareholders 
instead of the well-known agency problem between managers and shareholders. On 
the other hand, dispersed ownership (such as the UK and Ireland) needs additional 
control through more controlling committees and a higher number of independents. 
 
Figure 8: Corporate governance tendency in different European law rights levels  
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The results of board size and independent members of the bank’s board converge 
with the level of legal practices of European countries (Table 3 and Figure 8). The 
analyses of board characteristics show that board size and independent members are 
larger in countries with a higher level of legal protection. For example the average 
number of board members is around 12 while the average number of independents is 
7 (60%) in common law countries. In countries with a middle level of legal practices 
the average number of board members is 11 and the number of independents is 6 
(55%). The total number of board members is 9 in countries with low legal 
protection and the number of independents is 4 (45%).  
 
The average number of committees comes in line with the recommendations of the 
European banking commission and converges with the results of board 
characteristics. The maximum average number exists in common law countries with 
2.9 committees; the middle average number exists in Scandinavian and German civil 
law countries with 2.2 committees; and the minimum average number is 2.1 in civil 
law and former socialist countries. The existence of a higher number of committees 
is expected to improve risk management and remuneration control in the European 
banking sector.  
 
The results of CEO duality are correlated with the other corporate governance 
variables. Maximum duality exists in countries characterized by low legal 
protection, and the minimum duality exists in countries characterized by a high level 
of legal protection.    
 
These results of the number of committees and CEO duality indicate that countries 
with high legal practices are more likely to follow the international 
recommendations for corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector.  
 
For the remuneration practices of European banks the averages of ExCO (Natural 
logarithm of the three highest executive pay) are very close between different 
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European countries with 14.6 as a maximum value in English common law countries 
and 13.96 as a minimum value in French civil law countries and Ex-Socialist 
countries. 
 
b. Empirical Results of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
European Banking Performance 
Descriptive statistical results of banking performance in European countries (Figure 
9) indicate that both ROA and ROE are positive in countries with low legal rights 
while ROA and ROE are negative in countries with high legal rights. In countries 
with a middle level of legal protection, the results indicate that ROE has a positive 
value while ROA has a negative value. These results contradict expectations and 
deep analyses should be developed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Performance of banking sector  
 
 
To examine the impact of corporate governance variables on the performance of 
European banks and to understand the results presented in Figure 9, the following 
regression is conducted by considering the level of legal protection: 
 
(Bank Performance)it = β0 +β1OC it+ β2 BOI it+ β3 BOS it  +  β4 CEOD it + β5 CA it + β6 
ExCO it + β7 Bsize it + β8LEV it + β9NPEL it + εit 
 
Where the dependent variables are measured by ROA and ROE and the independent 
variables are measured by all the corporate governance variables and the control 
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variables presented in Table 1. (εit) is the error term and β parameters are the 
estimated coefficients for each of the explanatory variables in the regression. 
 
Before running the regression, two tests were applied. Both (χ2) and (F) values 
indicate no evidence of heteroscedasticity. Also, Hausman’s test was conducted to 
differentiate between random effects and fixed effects model in panel data. In this 
study random effects model is preferred under the null hypothesis due to its 
efficiency.  
 
Table 4: Regression results  
 Dependent variable ROE % Dependent variable ROA % 
Independent 
variable 
A1 B1 C1 A2 B2 C2 
Ownership 
concentration 
(OCit) 
0.002 
(0.684) 
-
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.511) 
-0.276 
(2.341) 
-0.194 
(0.383) 
-0.152 
(0.451) 
Independent 
members in 
Board (BOI it) 
1.443* 
(0.076) 
1.425* 
(0.068) 
1.344* 
(0.071) 
1.631**
* 
(0.022) 
1.952**
* 
(0.042) 
2.027**
* 
(0.034) 
Board size 
(BOS it) 
-0.025** 
(-2.455) 
-0.027 
(-1.151) 
-0.021 
(-1.035) 
-0.326** 
(-2.545) 
-0.372 
(-0.968) 
-0.459 
(-1.369) 
CEO Duality 
(CEODit) 
-0.005 
(-0.064) 
-0.004 
(-0.087) 
-0.003 
(-0.072) 
-0.012 
(-0.069) 
-0.023 
(-0.082) 
-0.018 
(-0.093) 
Number of 
controlling 
committees (CA 
it) 
1.722* 
(0.061) 
1.625* 
(0.058) 
1.534* 
(0.042) 
1.351** 
(0.022) 
1.299** 
(0.052) 
1.227* 
(0.039) 
Executive pay 
(ExCO it) 
1.729 
(0.212) 
1.265 
(0.285) 
1.076 
(0.199) 
1.321 
(0.214) 
1.551 
(0.141) 
1.342 
(0.154) 
Bank Size 
(Bsize it) 
1.518 
(0.131) 
1.351 
(0.146) 
1.234 
(0.162) 
1.041 
(0.134) 
1.036 
(0.171) 
1.022 
(0.154) 
Leverage (LEV 
it) 
0.165** 
(2.832) 
0.147** 
(2.451) 
0.138* 
(2.318) 
0.261**
* 
(0.004) 
0.272**
* 
(0.005) 
0.241** 
(2.104) 
Non-
performance 
loan (NPEL it) 
1.231 
(0.282) 
1.345 
(0.285) 
1.476 
(0.196) 
1.381 
(0.194) 
1.251 
(0.217) 
1.452 
(0.254) 
Constant  
1.102***
* 
(23.43) 
1.154*** 
(24.2) 
1.140**
* 
(22.83) 
2.921**
* 
(3.10) 
3.031**
* 
(3.25) 
3.216**
* 
(3.08) 
Number of 
observations 
723 621 246 723 621 246 
R-Square 0.276 0.295 0.326 0.343 0.386 0.423 
Fisher-ratio 5.73*** 4.24*** 3.35*** 4.63*** 4.32*** 3.64*** 
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Note: This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from ordinary least 
squares regressions with robust standard errors. Significance levels: (***) <1%; (**) <5%; 
(*) <10%; 
A1 and A2 represent the regressions in countries with low legal rights; 
B1 and B2 represent the regressions in countries with middle legal rights; 
C1 and C2 represent the regressions in countries with high legal rights. 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results which reveal the impact of corporate 
governance variables on the performance of European banks during the post-crisis 
period 2012-2013. Regressions A1 and A2 represent the results of corporate 
governance variables in countries characterized by low level of legal rights, 
regressions B1 and B2 represent the results of corporate governance variables in 
countries characterized by middle level of legal rights and finally regressions C1 and 
C2 represent the results of corporate governance variables in countries characterized 
by high level of legal rights. 
 
The main results of regressions refer to the presence of significant relationships 
between the number of committees (CA) and bank performance in all European 
countries. If the number of committees increases, bank performance (ROA and 
ROE) increases in regressions A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 and C2. The presence of special 
committees represents an important tool to monitor corporate practices and protect 
shareholder value in the banking sector. For example, the presence of a remuneration 
committee can reduce the agency problem by designing incentive plans to align the 
interest of the CEO with those of the owners. Moreover, the presence of an audit 
committee can reduce the risk of expropriation by blockholders. These results come 
in line with the findings of Adams and Mehran (2003) in which they stated that the 
number of committees is one of the important tools to improve the performance of 
US banks. 
 
The results of regressions A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 and C2 indicate that the presence of 
independent members on the board of directors (BOI) has a positive impact on the 
bank performance. Due to their independence and qualification they provide the 
needed expertise for banking performance and viability by setting the basic strategy 
and direction. They represent a line of protection for shareholders against any 
expropriation and entrenchment behaviors of a CEO and blockholders. These results 
confirm the studies of El-Chaarani (2014), De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and 
Busta (2008) in which they found a positive impact of independent members on a 
bank’s profitability. 
 
From the results of regressions A1 and A2, it is observed that board size (BOS) has a 
negative impact on bank performance in countries characterized by a low level of 
legal rights. The impact of board size becomes non-significant in countries 
characterized by middle and high levels of legal rights. A large board size increases 
the decision-making time and reduces the capacity to monitor bank performance. In 
French civil law and former socialist countries, the banks’ CEO and blockholders 
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may expropriate the minorities (outsiders) through the development of non-effective 
board of directors.    
 
Finally, Table 4 indicates the absence of any significant and consistent impact of the 
other corporate governance variables (OC, CEOD and ExCO) on European banks’ 
performance, only the Leverage variable (LEV) has a consistent and significant 
positive impact on bank performance. To sum up, there is no consistent evidence 
that corporate governance variables and legal protection level have a mutual impact 
on banks’ performance.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Over the last ten years, and after the recommendations of the international 
organizations and banks federations, many European countries have substantially 
reformed their banks’ regulations. Based on the analysis of 935 European banks in 
30 European countries, it appears that certain European countries have reformed 
their regulations to empower the performance and the monitoring system of the 
banking sector consistently with the international recommendation of corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
It is found that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms is affected 
by the level of legal rights in European countries (Figure 10). In common law 
countries such as the UK and Ireland, the international recommendations on 
corporate governance are well respected and applied. For example, in these countries 
the level of independents in bank boards and the number of committees, such as 
audit, remuneration, nomination and risk committees, have the maximum average in 
Europe. Alternatively, the ownership concentration and the duality level between the 
board president and CEO have the minimum average in Europe. Finally, the average 
board size and the remuneration level are considered the highest in common law 
countries. 
 
In low legal rights countries such as French civil law and former socialist countries, 
the results indicate that the following of the international corporate governance 
codes is less respected and the risk of expropriation is very high. The number of 
committees and independents of bank boards have the minimum average in Europe, 
while the ownership concentration and the CEO duality have the maximum average 
in Europe. In this group of European countries, the remuneration average and the 
board size also have the minimum average.  
 
In middle legal rights countries such as German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries all the corporate governance variables are quantified in the middle average 
of European countries. These results beside the results of low and high legal rights 
countries lead us to conclude a direct correlation between the implementation of 
corporate governance codes and legal rights level. 
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Figure 10: Corporate governance practices in European banking sector 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the existing research has focused on the mutual impacts of legal rights 
and corporate governance practices on the performance of European banks. Results 
reveal that there is no evidence that certain European countries have reformed their 
corporate governance practices for the better. Even the existence of different levels 
of legal rights, all European countries are influenced by corporate governance 
variables in the same manner and level. The independent members of bank boards 
and the number of committees have a positive impact on bank performance whatever 
the level of legal rights. Only in countries characterized by a low level of legal rights 
the results reveal a negative impact on board size on banks’ performance. 
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This study has several limitations and it can be extended in various dimensions. 
Firstly, the performance variables (ROE and ROA) are not sufficient to reflect the 
different dimensions of bank performance. Other variables can be used, such as 
liquidity, deposit and risk levels.  
 
Secondly, the number of committees cannot efficiently reflect their performance and 
contribution in term of monitoring and organization. This variable must be studied 
by considering the composition of committees and the number of meetings each 
year. Thirdly, the study period is very limited so it should be developed over a 
longer period of time.  
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